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Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank:
A Move Toward More Favorable Valuation for
the Expropriating Nation
During the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and 1960, the government of
Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, Che Guevera, and others, nationalized
the economy of Cuba.' The Cuban nationalization process has been
termed "one of the most sweeping reforms of ownership of the means of
production and distribution in history."' 2 As a result of nationalization,
the Cuban economy shifted from one of private enterprise to an economy
of "state capitalism."'3 This dramatic transformation obviously affected
foreign entities doing business with Cuba.
As part of the nationalization process, commercial banks were expropriated. Banco Nacional de Cuba was made "sole official licensor of
all foreign payments and any remissions of profits earned in Cuba by
alien owned enterprises."' 4 Furthermore, certain currency regulations
were imposed and international trade was restricted. 5 Three days after
Cuba nationalized the U.S. banks, Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) sold
collateral worth $17,000,000 for a bank loan it had made to Cuba in
1958.6 This sale resulted in a seven million dollar surplus for Chase, because the collateral was at that point worth more than the remaining
debt owed Chase. 7 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank 8
See generally M. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN

(1976); H. MATTHEWS, REVOLUTION IN CUBA (1975).
2 M. GORDON, supra note 1, at 108.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412, 419 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
4Id.

5 See generall M. GORDON, note I supra.
6 505 F. Supp. at 423.
7 Id. The original loan to Banco Nacional was for $30,000,000, but this amount had been
reduced by partial payments to $10,000,000 at the time of nationalization. Id.
8 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), afg as modified, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Banco
and the case of Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505 F. Supp.
412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'dand remanded, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), were decided together in the
lower court though they were not consolidated and were decided separately on appeal. Both
cases present related issues of fact and law. The lower court decision was joint as the post-trial
hearings were conducted jointly. The two cases were originally heard by the late Judge Bryan
in the district court. They were two of a larger number of cases which the Second Circuit has
recently decided. The other cases include: First Nat'l Bank of Boston (Int'l) v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co., 658 F.2d
903 (2d Cir. 1981); and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d
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(Banco), Banco Nacional sought recovery of this collateral surplus plus
some two and one-half million dollars of its deposits that were frozen in
the United States the day following bank nationalization. 9 Chase conceded that it owed Banco Nacional a total of $9,793,021.70, but decided
to set-off this sum against claims for its expropriated assets. 10 In Banco,
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, and
most recently the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, were confronted with
the problem of determining what value should be accorded expropriated
U.S. banking assets as a "set-off' against the Cuban assets frozen in the
United States.
The lower court determined that Cuba must fully compensate
Chase for its expropriated assets, because international law had been violated by the expropriation.' I That court held that the proper measure of
the value of the expropriated banking assets was their market value as a
"going concern," because Cuba did not liquidate the banks but continued to use them as banks. 12 Furthermore, the district court stated that
the market value of the assets was that amount which the U.S. Government would pay under an eminent domain proceeding.13 This value was
determined on the basis of circumstances as they existed shortly before
bank nationalization.1 4 By so holding, the lower court followed the classical doctrine of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" as enunciated by the U.S. State Department.' 5
On appeal, the Second Circuit discussed four alternate standards for
compensation. They included: (1) no compensation, (2) partial compensation, (3) appropriate compensation, and (4) full compensation. 16 The
Second Circuit found that no compensation or partial compensation did
not reflect international law.17 The court awarded compensation which
it felt represented both "appropriate" and "full compensation."',8
Though the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court decision, it did so
Cir. 1981). The last three cases were consolidated for argument and were decided in one opinion on appeal.
Past litigation regarding the Cuban expropriations has been extensive. Cases most relevant
to the instant discussion include: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F.
Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S.
1019 (1971), on remand, 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964), on remandsub nom. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
9 See 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1980), which is part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
10 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir. 1981).
1 505 F. Supp. at 434-35.
12 Id. at 445.
13 Id. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
14 505 F. Supp. at 448.
15 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 658-59 (1942); contra, de Archaga, State Responstiityfor the Nattbnaliattonof Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
179 (1978).
16 658 F.2d at 891.
7 id.
18 Id. at 892.

THE EXPROPRIATING

NATION

with modification. The appellate court refused to allow set-off for the
value of the U.S. banks as "going concerns," 1 9 indicating that awards for
the expropriated banks as going concerns took "insufficient account of
the acknowledged state of the Cuban economy following the
revolution."

' 20

The lower court refused to award pre-judgment interest on the value
awarded to Banco Nacional. 2' This was an extremely important holding
because so much time had elapsed since the expropriation that the inter22
est on the frozen assets amounted to much more than the principal.
The appellate opinion is unclear as to the interest issue. The Second
23
Circuit awarded "such pre-judgment interest as may be appropriate.
Because the lower court had earlier refused to grant any interest, what is
meant by the words of the appellate opinion remains to be determined.
Banco is significant because it is one of the first two of the numerous
Cuban expropriation cases litigated in the U.S. court system to have ac24
tually reached the central issue of the value of the expropriated assets.
Much of the other litigation has centered on the Act of State Doctrine 25
and the Hickenlooper Amendment. 26 In this case, however, an in-depth
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 893.
Id.
505 F. Supp. at 449.

Id.
658 F.2d at 894.
The other case which reached the valuation issue is Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de

Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1981). Although these are the first U.S. court cases to reach the valuation issue, the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission has made numerous valuations of expropriated Cuban assets.
See In the Matter of the Claim of The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., F.C.S.C. Decision No.
CU-6295, at 2 (Oct. 20, 1971), which awarded Chase going concern value for its nationalized
branches. See also 1972 FCSC Ann. Rep. 125-412; 1970 FCSC Ann. Rep. 25-83; 1969 FCSC
Ann. Rep. 24-82.
25 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), on remandsub nom.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26 22 U.S.C. § 2270(e)(2) (1976) (originally enacted as Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009 amended by Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-171, § 301(d)(2), 79 Stat. 653). The Hickenlooper Amendment was enacted to reverse
the Supreme Court's holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), on
remand sub nom. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 and 272 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), afd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). In Sabbatino,
the Supreme Court upheld immunity for Cuba under the Act of State Doctrine. 376 U.S. at
439. This doctrine as enunciated in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), states that
[eivery sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on acts of the
government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves. 168 U.S. at 252.
When Cuba initiated the Banco action, it probably assumed that it would have complete immunity under the Act of State Doctrine. The Hickenlooper (Sabbatino) Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, however, created a presumption that courts could proceed with an
adjudication on the merits unless the President declared that application of the Act of State
Doctrine was necessary to U.S. foreign policy interests. The Act also suspended aid to nations
7
not complying with U.S. norms of expropriation compensation. 22 U.S.C. § 23 0(g) (1976).
1967), was
166
(2d
Cir.
383
F.2d
v.
Farr,
de
Cuba
Sabbatino, on remandsub nom., Banco Nacional
decided pursuant to the Hickenlooper Amendment, thereby rejecting Cuban immunity under
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analysis was conducted by the courts with regard to the actual value of
the expropriated assets.
The courts examined three Cuban laws relevant to the expropriated
banks. These laws legally enabled Cuba to expropriate the assets of the
U.S. banks. They were: Article 24 of the "Fundamental Law,"'2 7 Law
No. 85 1,28 and the "Bank Nationalization Law."'2 9 Article 24 of the
"Fundamental Law" (the Cuban Constitution), which was passed in
February 1959, prohibited confiscation by the state of foreign property
"except by competent judicial authority and for justifiable reasons . . .
and always after payment of adequate indemnity. ' 30 This provision for
compensation, however, did not apply to any property owned by Batista,
president of the former government, or any of his collaborators who
might have been responsible for economic crimes or who had been unjustly enriched.3 1 "Non-compliance with these requirements shall give
the person whose property has been expropriated the right to protection
'32
by the courts and, if the case warrants, to restitution of his property.
This initial provision for expropriation was followed by several others.
In early July 1960, Cuban Law No. 851, 3 3 providing for the nationalization of Cuban businesses and properties owned by U.S. citizens, was
passed. Pursuant to this law, and Resolution 2 of Law No. 851 enacted
thereunder, U.S. banking operations were confiscated on September 16,
1960.

34

On October 13, 1960, following the actual nationalization, the Cuban "Bank Nationalization Law" 35 was passed. The preamble indicates
that nationalization was part of an overall scheme aimed at restructuring
the whole banking system. Under this law, Banco Nacional became the
legal successor of the U.S. banks which "were declared dissolved and extinguished."'36 Article 5 of that law provides for a right of indemnity
under a system selected by the President of Banco Nacional as of Decemthe Act of State Doctrine. 383 F.2d at 171-72. This was later reaffirmed in the case of Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of China, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976).
27 LEY PRIMERA, CONSTITUCION, art. 24 (1959) (Cuba). The current constitution states:
The expropriation of property for reasons of public benefit or social interest and
with due compensation is authorized.
The law establishes the method for the expropriation and the bases on which the
need for and usefulness of this action are to be determined as well as the form of
compensation, taking into account the interest and the economic and social needs
of the person whose property has been expropriated. LEY PRIMERA, CONSTICION, art. 25 (Cuba).
28 Ley No. 851, 6 Jul. 1960.
29 Ley No. 891, 13 Oct. 1960.
30 LEY PRIMERA, supra note 27, art. 24.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33

Ley No. 851, 6 Jul. 1960.

34 Resolucion No. 2, 17 Sept. 1960. Following passage of this Resolution, the United

States ended diplomatic relations and stopped transfer of funds pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 515
(1980).
35 Ley No. 891, 13 Oct. 1960.
36 505 F. Supp. at 422.
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ber 31, 1960.3 7 In spite of the promised indemnity under these laws, no
system was ever devised 38 and no compensation has ever been paid by
39
Cuba.
Because no compensation was made, Chase asserted, and was
awarded in district court, a set-off for the alleged value of its four Cuban
branches, an amount which included both goodwill and going business
value. On appeal, Chase asserted that the valuation fixed by the lower
court was too low in spite of the fact that the award was made for going
concern value. Chase's claim of right to set-off was based alternatively
on either conversion constituting a violation of international law or on
implied contract. 40 The Second Circuit affirmed Chase's claim based on
the conversion theory, and as such did not address the "fall back" theory
of implied contract. 4' Going concern value was not allowed as part of
the appellate award, however.
The defendant U.S. bank acknowledged that it could not proceed
affirmatively against Banco Nacional or the Cuban Government because
of the Act of State Doctrine and sovereign immunity. National City Bank
v. Republic of Chitna 4 2 held, however, that if a foreign country seeks redress
in U.S. courts, counterclaims are permissible. 43 The Repubhc of China
holding is reinforced by 28 U.S.C. § 1607,44 which specifically denies immunity to a foreign state proceeding affirmatively in U.S. courts. It is
important to note, however, that this statute permits counterclaims only
"to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in
amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state."'4 5
Because of this limitation on recovery by the U.S. banks, Banco Nacional
had nothing to lose by initiating this litigation-at worst it would not
recover the assets already taken by Chase.
37 Id. at 422-23.
38 Id. at 445.
39 The parties stipulated that payment was not made. 658 F.2d at 878.
40 Chase also asserted set-off as trustee for U.S. investors owning leased railroad equipment in possession of two Cuban railroads. Both railroads were expropriated during the revolution, and Chase claimed four million dollars as set-off. This claim was disallowed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b) because Chase asserted the claim in its fiduciary capacity, while it
was being sued in its corporate capacity. Id. at 885-86; 505 F. Supp. at 435-36, 440.
41 658 F. 2d at 880 n.9.
42 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
43 Id. at 363.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976) states:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state shall not be
accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity
under section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a separate action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding
in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
45 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1976).
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In district court, Banco Nacional raised several defenses to the counterclaims. 46 First, Banco Nacional asserted that it was a separate entity
from the Cuban Government and therefore was not liable for obligations
of the Cuban Government resulting from the expropriations. 4 7 The
lower court rejected this argument, finding that Banco Nacional was an
alter ego of the Cuban Government. 48 This finding was not challenged
on appeal. 49 Second, Banco Nacional claimed that even if it and the
government of Cuba are "indistinguishable entities," any claims against
it were nonjusticiable because of sovereign immunity and the Act of
State Doctrine.5 0 Relying on the Supreme Court's split decision in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,5 1 the Second Circuit found
the claim to be justiciable, because it met all possible requirements of the
separate opinions in that case. 52 These requirements included the fact
that:
(1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bemrstein letter advising the
courts that it believes act of state doctrine need not be applied,(2) there
is no showing that an adjudication of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign relations, and (3) the claim against the foreign sovereign is
and does not exceed the value of the
asserted by way of
53 counterclaim

sovereign's claim.
Banco Nacional also argued that, based on contemporary practice, "at
best, all that is necessary ispartial payment for the value of the property
taken."'54 Banco Nacional pointed out that much of the post-World War
II precedent in the compensation-valuation area was found in lump-sum
agreements. Generally speaking, these agreements provided compensation equivalent to only forty to sixty percent of the value of a plaintiff's
claim. 55 Both courts rejected the lump-sum agreements as a justification
for partial payment, distinguishing the agreements as a product of diplomatic bargaining, not appropriate for use in a judicial determination of
the value of expropriated assets. 56 As the Second Circuit pointed out,
adjudication should not be confused with compromise. 57 Banco Na46 The defenses relevant to Chase as trustee will not be discussed. See discussion at 658
F.2d at 885-87.
47 505 F. Supp. at 429.
48 Id,

49 658 F.2d at 880 n.6.
50 Id. at 880.
51 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
52 658 F.2d at 881-85.
53 Id. at 884. Sovereign immunity was held not to be a valid defense in National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 384 U.S. 356 (1955). Act of State also fails as a defense as discussed
note 26 supra.
54 505 F. Supp. at 432.
55 Richard Lillich testified before Judge Bryan that lump-sum agreements were generally
40 to 60% of the value of the claims. Id. For a discussion of lump-sum agreements, see R.
LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS (1975).
56 505 F. Supp. at 433. The court also noted that expropriating countries would probably

refuse to settle for a figure of full payment.
57 658 F.2d at 892.
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cional initiated this judicial action and as such should not expect the
court to be bound by nonjudicial settlements. Having rejected Banco
Nacional's defenses, the courts proceeded to deal with the issue of compensation for the expropriated assets.
Both courts first determined the standard of compensation to be
used. As the Supreme Court in Banco Naconal de Cuba v. Sabbatino58 had
pointed out, there is a huge discrepancy in international law between the
views of the developed nations and the developing nations as to what
constitutes just compensation:
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards reflects an
even more basic divergence between the national interests of capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the social ideologies
of those countries that favor state control of a considerable portion of the
59
means of production and those that adhere to a free enterprise system.
The classical doctrine of compensation, as stated by Secretary of
State Hull in 1938, is that "no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor." 6° In 1962, however, the United
Nations passed a resolution providing for a different standard of compensation. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII)6 1 on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources states that "appropriate compensation" must be made "in accordance with international law."'62 In the
past, the United States has interpreted the U.N. standard under Resolu63
tion 1803 to mean "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation.
This interpretation is in accord with both Hull's statement of U.S. policy6 and the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States65 (Restatement) which requires "full payment."'6 6 In the past, the
United States has thus taken a stand demanding a high degree of
compensation.
50 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
59 Id. at 430.
60 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 15, at 658-59. For an analysis of the classical compensation

standard and early opposition trends, see F. Garcia-Amador, Fourth Report on International
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/119 (1959).
61 G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 17, U.N. Doc.A/5217 (1962), reprinted
61 57 Am.J. INT'L L. 710 (1963).
62 Id.
63 Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law: Toward a Consensus or
More "Rich Chaos"?, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 183, 185 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
64 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 15, at 658-59.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 185-188 (1965).
66 Id. § 185. Both the district court and the court of appeals found that a violation of
international law existed. 658 F.2d at 891; 505 F. Supp. at 429. The two courts differed as to
the resulting compensation due for such a violation. The lower court required full and prompt
compensation. 505 F. Supp. at 433. The Second Circuit hinted that "appropriate compensation" might be all that was due, though the court stated that in the instant case "appropriate"
and "full" compensation were synonymous. 658 F.2d at 892-93.
Pursuant to the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, if no violation had been found,
only "just" compensation would have been required. RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at § 186.

N.C.J.
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Though the United States continues to advocate "full" or "prompt,
adequate, and effective" compensation, the growing power of the Third
World has made this view increasingly difficult to maintain. 67 It certainly cannot be relied upon today in a dispute between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries. 68 The Supreme Court in Banco
Naional de Cuba v. Sabbatt'o 69 observed as follows:
Communist countries, although they have in fact provided a degree of
compensation after diplomatic efforts, commonly recognize no obligation on the part of the taking country. Certain representatives of the

newly independent and underdeveloped countries have questioned
whether rules of state responsibility toward aliens can bind nations that
have not consented to them and it is argued that the traditionally articulated standards governing expropriation of property reflect "imperialist"

and are inappropriate to the circumstances of emergent
interests
70
states.

Richard Lillich, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia and noted
author in the area of international claims, states, in The Valuation of Nationahzzed Property in InternationalLaw, that the United States would be
very happy today if the United Nations would merely reaffirm its "appropriate compensation" standard. 7' Lillich thinks that the United
States made a "major tactical error" when it refused to "acknowledge the
judicial importance of Resolution 1803 (XVII).' ' 72 Even in the early
1960's commentators such as Dawson and Weston wrote that "full" compensation was not by any means a binding rule of international law:
Far from being a "rule" of international law in the extensive deprivation
context, the demand for "full" or "prompt, adequate, and effective"
compensation would appear to be little more than a preference assumed
for bargaining purposes-an element of legal mythology to which
ritualistic tribute and which has little meaning in effecspokesmen pay
73
tive policy.

In the past, the United States has refused to compromise its position
74
Ironically, the United
by accepting "appropriate" compensation.
States is now in a worse situation than it might have been had it been
willing to compromise in the past. 75 As previously noted, Communist
countries typically hold today that no compensation need be paid for
assets they expropriate. 76 "International law seeks to harmonize . . 77.
these distinct, yet interdependent interests to achieve . . . stability."
67 de Archaga, supra note 15, at 181.
68 Lillich, supra note 63, at 184-85.
69 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
70 Id. at 429-30.
71 Lillich, supra note 63, at 184-85.
72 Id. at 185.
73 Dawson & Weston, Prompt, Adequate andEfcti.e: A UniversalStandardof Compensattn?, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 727, 757 (1962).
74 Lillich, supra note 63, at 185.
75 Id.
76 Note, Real Property Valuation for Foreign Wealth Deprivations, 54 IowA L. REv. 89, 91

(1968).
77 Dawson & Weston, supra note 55, at 728.
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Because of the emergence of the developing countries, particularly since
the Second World War, 78 and the hard-line stance taken by Communist
countries, this harmonization has become increasingly difficult to
79
achieve.
The United States lost more ground in 1972 when the United Nations Counsel on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) passed Resolution 88 (XII) concerning permanant sovereignty over natural resources.8 0
It stated that "it is for each State to fix the amount of compensation."'
Two years later, with passage of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties,8 2 the United Nations modified its earlier standard of "appropriate compensation" to a standard of "appropriate under the circumstances." 8 3 Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources8 4 "[a]ffirms that the application of the principle of
nationalization . . . implies that each State is entitled to determine the
amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment .... ,,as According to these documents, each state is now free to determine its own
standard of compensation. The Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order,8 6 adopted in 1974, goes even further, reaffirming a state's inalienable right to nationalize, while making no
mention of compensation with the exception of the right of developing
states to be paid "full" compensation for their exploited natural resources. These U.N. resolutions, however, hardly settle the dispute on
the international standard of compensation.8 7 All four of these Resolutions were the product of Third World efforts; thus, there remains a
sharp disagreement between the developed and developing countries as
to what is the international standard of compensation.88 Of course, as
Lillich observes, no single rule can be stated that would provide just compensation in all cases.8 9 Furthermore, it is not desirable to have either a
78 Feuer, Riflexions sur laCharlte des droits eldevoirs iconomiques des itats, 79 REVUE GENERALE
DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 273, 274-75 (1975).

79 See generally Note, note 76 supra.
80 12 U.N. TCOR, Supp. I, at 1, U.N. Doc. TD/B/421 (1972), reprinted in II INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1474-75 (1972). The vote was 39-2-23, with abstention by the developing countries
and opposition by the United States and Greece.
81 Id.
82 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).

83 Id. art. 2(c).
84 U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171 (XXVIII) (1974), reprintedin 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 381-83 (1974).
85 Id. Cuba has not established its own standard of compensation although it has passed
laws enabling it to do so. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
86 U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (1974), reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 715-19
(1974) and 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 798-801 (1974).
87 Brower & Tepe, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of
InternattnalLaw, 9 INT'L LAWYER 295 (1975).

88 For example, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom,
and the United States all voted against the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, note 82
supra. Austria, Canada, Spain, France, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Norway, and the Nether-

lands all abstained from the vote. FEUER, supra note 78, at 300.
89 Lillich, supra note 63, at 197.
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single standard of compensation or valuation.9° Orrego Vicufia, Professor of International Law at the University of Chile and Director of the
Institute of International Studies, has pointed out that "there is no pur'pose in establishing a single or rigid standard." 9 1 Competing interests
must always be weighed in light of the individual case. International law
by its very nature requires flexibility and balancing. Any "international
norms should provide for alternative valuation standards that could be
applied in accordance with particular circumstances and the kind of
of a "plurality of well-defined stanproperty affected." '92 This approach
93
dards" entails many variables.
A large number of valuation methods exist today. 94 These include
capitalized market value (which includes value as a going concern), replacement value, book value, and sales value of real assets.9 5 Use of capitalized market value presumes that a government is like an investor
96
bidding for a take-over of a business on a stock exchange.
"[C]apitalized market value is based on the expected profitability of the
operation as a going concern (going business value), with an appropriate
time discount factor."' 9 7 This theory rests on the idea that
the value of an appropriated asset (or investment), both to the deprived
owner and to the depriving authority, will depend more or less on the
future earnings (or benefits) that each would expect to obtain, and on
that each would hope to avoid, as a result of that
the burdens
98
ownership.
90 Vicufla, The InternationalRegulation of Valuation Standards and Processes. A Reexamination of
Third World Perspectives, in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 131, 146-47 (R. Lillich ed. 1975).
91 Id. at 146.
92 Id. at 146-47.
93 Id. at 134.
94 Several methods actually used in the past are discussed in M. WHITEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143-63 (1967).
95 Girvan, ExpropriatigtheExpropriators. Compensation Crtieriafrom a Third World Viewpomnt,
in 3 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 149, 166-68 (R.

Lillich ed. 1975). The Chilean copper case, which involved the 1971 nationalization of U.S.
copper companies in Chile, used book value less excess profits. This was in accord with the
valuation allowed by a Chilean Constitutional Amendment, yet was arguably below the award
required by international law. Lillich, InternationalLaw and the Chilean Nationalizatons: The Valuation of theCopper Companies, in 2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 121 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).

The U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) has been active in determination
of expropriated property values. See 95 CONG. REC. 8836-56 (1949) for the legislative history of
the formation of the FCSC. See also, Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, in I THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 100 (R. Lillich ed. 1972). The FCSC determines expropriated property values
based on a system "most" appropriate to the property and equitable to the claimant, including,
but not limited to (i) fair market value, (ii) book value, (iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of
replacement. 22 U.S.C. § 1643(b)(A) (1976). In reality, however, the FCSC often does not
reveal the valuation methods it uses. Smith, Real Property Valuationfor Foreign Wealth Deprivations,
in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (R. Lillich
ed. 1972).
96 Girvan, supra note 95, at 166 n.29.
97 Id.
98 Weigel & Weston, Valuation Upon the Deprivation of Foreign Enterprise: A Polic-Oriented
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Going business value includes capital, physical assets, and goodwill.
Goodwill was defined in this case by the district court as
the pure dollar value of the right to receive the stream of income after
the necessary capital has been invested to enable the purchaser to continue in the business. It is the "premium" which the purchaser of a profof the tangible
itable business pays, over and above the value 99
components necessary to the operation of the business.

Three basic factors which generally can be considered to constitute goodwill are: (1) excess value, (2) favorable customer relations, and (3) the
privilege of continuance.10° The first two are factual considerations
while the third is a legal concept. These three factors are influenced by
such variables as "location; manufacturing efficiency; satisfactory relations between the employees and the management; adequate sources of
capital and a credit standard . ..advertising; monopolistic privileges;
and in general, good business management."' 0'1 All of these factors make
actual valuation of goodwill a very difficult process.
The major criticism of use of the capitalized market value method of
valuation is that capitalized market value includes the profits of the business.10 2 Consideration of profits in determining the value of an expropriated business is objectionable to Third World countries, especially with
regard to businesses engaged in the exploitation of natural resources,
where the profit comes from use of minerals that the state itself really
owns. 10 3 In that situation, Third World countries are especially reluctant to award compensation for goodwill. The capitalized market value
method is considered more favorable to the Developed World, although
the "purchasing government" can regulate the "selling" company's profits by mere regulation of its tax rate. 10 4 Another problem inherent in this
method is that each party will value the earnings differently.
A second method used is replacement value, which is the cost of
replacing the fixed assets that a company loses to expropriation. 0 5 This
method, too, is considered favorable to the Developed World, because
the company is compensated to the extent necessary for replacement of
its lost fixed assets. 10 6 No compensation, however, is awarded for
goodwill.
Book value and sales value of real assets are considered to be methods of valuation favorable to the Developing World because they usually
lead to low figures. 10 7 Book value is the equivalent of total assets minus
Approach to the Probem of Compensation Under InternationalLaw, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 19 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
99 505 F. Supp. at 460.
100 Comment, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 660, 661 (1953).
101 H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING 216-17 (6th ed. 1953).
102 Girvan, supra note 95, at 166.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 167.
105Smith, supra note 95, at 155-56.
106 Id.
l07 Girvan, supra note 95, at 167-68.
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total liabilities.10 8 Several problems exist with the use of this method.
First, if assets are overestimated or underestimated, the value will be
greater or less than the market value of the company. Also, if liabilities
are not estimated correctly, the book value will not be correct. 10 9 Furthermore, calculations of book value are based on the assumption that
the company is a going concern, 110 but make no award for the value of
the business as a going concern. In addition, depreciation can play an
important role with this method."' If a company's assets are old, they
may be worth little or nothing on the books while at the same time having substantial market value. After examining the use of this method in
nationalization settlements, one commentator concluded that
generally accepted principles of accounting result in a book value of
owner's equity that usually is less than fair value, occasionally is greater
than fair value, and only by coincidence is equal to fair value. Book
value is not intended to be an equitable basis for settling
nationalization
1 12
claims and should not be used for that purpose.

If sales value of real assets is employed as a valuation method, a
company will usually receive even less compensation than if book value is
used. Under this theory, physical assets are valued as they would be on
the market." 13 This means that, for example, machinery in a factory
would at best be valued as second-hand and at worst as scrap. 114 Furthermore, the land value is sharply depressed in many cases because of
problems inherent in dealing with an unstable government.
The various methods of valuation represent three different views as
to the value for which compensation should be given after an expropriation: the value to the taker, the value to the original owner, and the
market value."15 Developed countries have traditionally sought recom16
pense in terms of value to the original owner. The Chorzow Factory case"
has long been relied upon by the developed world as its standard for
valuation. Chorzow states that for an illegal act, "reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed." ' 17 In the past, the United States has accepted
this case as valid law."e8 Leading authorities, such as de Ar6chaga, former President of the International Court of Justice, however, have stated
that the Chorzow doctrine has been "deprived of [its] relevance" in the
108 McCosker, Book Values in Naiwnah'zaton Settlements, in 2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

109 Id. at 57.
I10Id. at 40.

I

Girvan, supra note 95, at 167.
McCosker, supra note 108, at 51.
113 Girvan, supra note 95, at 168.
112

114 Id.
115Smith, supra note 95, at 141.
116 [1928] P.C.I.J., ser.
A, No. 17.
117 Id. at 47.
118 505 F. Supp. at 446-47.

36, 36 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
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contemporary world.' 1 9 De Ar6chaga's contention is based on the idea
that today nationalization or expropriation is a "sovereign right of the
State and. . . consequently entirely lawful."' 20 Thus, "the general rules
of State responsibility that govern unlawful acts can no longer be applied."' 12 1 Both de Ar6chaga and the Third World generally espouse the
view that the key to valuation should be "the beneficial gain which has
22
been obtained by the nationalizing State."'
Into this unsettled area of compensation and valuation came the
Banco case. The Banco court had to choose which standards it would use.
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's statement that Sabbatino 123 required international law, not local law, be applied. 24 The two
courts differed as to the interpretation of international law, however.
The lower court noted that it "should avoid identifying as a principle of
international law, what is actually only a policy of our nation."'' 25 Yet,
the district court chose to apply what is clearly the U.S. standard, noting
that "[a]s a district court, we are not free to overlook or neglect the interpretation of international law reiterated a hundred times over in the
American courts simply because some other nations in public debate and
diplomatic correspondence, have expressed a different view."' 126 The
Second Circuit, as discussed i'nia, took a more liberal stand. The expropriation was held by the district court to constitute a violation of international law and therefore "American citizens in Cuba are and were
entitled to full and prompt recompense for their private property seized,
to be made in funds convertible to dollars."' 127 This standard included
recovery for the banking assets as a going concern. The lower court supported the use of going concern value with its finding that Cuba had
continued to use Chase's branches as banks, rather than liquidating
them.'12 In addition, the district court observed that "[t]he applicable
value will be that which our own Government would pay to a domestic
corporation under our laws of eminent domain."' 129 Under eminent domain proceedings, the U.S. Government uses going concern value in its
determination of awards. 130 The standard is market value, "what a will119 de Arechaga, supra note 15, at 181.
120 Id. at 180.
121 Id. at 181. Other Third World perspectives are discussed in Vicufia, note 90 supra.
122 de Ar6chaga, supra note 15, at 182. Under this principle, de Ar&chaga stated that no
compensation isdue if an expropriated business is totally suppressed for policy reasons. Id. It is
only for the extent to which a State has been unjustly enriched that de Arechaga thinks compensation is required. Id.
123 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1962).
124 505 F. Supp. at 435; 658 F.2d at 887-88.
125 505 F. Supp. at 435.
126 Id. at 432.
127 The court relied on such sources as the RESTATEMENT, note 65 supra, the Chorzow Factory case, note 116 supra, the Hickenlooper Amendment, note 26 supra and 22 U.S.C.
§ 1643(b)(A) (1976).
128 505 F. Supp. at 445.
129 Id.
130 Ste United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
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ing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller."''
Another important issue was discussed by the lower court with regard to valuation: whether or not the conduct of the Cuban Govern32
ment prior to the nationalization should be taken into account.'
According to the Restatement, "full value must be determined as of the
time of the taking, unaffected by the taking, by other related takings, or
by conduct attributable to the taking state and having the effect of depressing the value of the property in anticipation of the taking."133
Banco Nacional argued that it was unrealistic for the court to act as if
the Cuban Revolution never occurred. On appeal, the Second Circuit
agreed, although the lower court awarded valuation based on circum34
stances as they existed shortly before the time of nationalization.1
With these standards in mind, the district court began its computation of actual damages to defendant resulting from the expropriation.
Defendant asserted two basic theories of recovery. The first was a separate entity or contract theory, under which the Cuban branches of Chase
were treated as a subsidiary of the New York bank and a debtor-creditor
relationship was established.' 35 Under this theory, defendant alleged
that approximately six million dollars were owed to Chase by its former
Cuban branches.' 36 Under an alternative theory, the conversion or single entity theory, defendant alleged over eight million dollars as setoff.' 3 7 The single entity theory was based on the idea that the Cuban
branches were the property of the home bank and therefore plaintiff
owed compensation to defendant for conversion. This theory included
recovery for the asset as a going concern. After discussion of both theories, the lower court stated that it mattered little whether the claim was
posited on either of these two theories, or on a reverse condemnation
theory or on an alleged violation of international law theory 3 ' because
39
Chase was entitled to "full, fair and prompt recompense" in any case. '
'3' Id.
132 The Cuban Revolution and threat of nationalization had a prior depressing effect on
the value of the banking assets. 505 F. Supp. at 446.
133 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 188, Comment b. This part of the RESTATEMENT appears to echo the Chorzow decision, [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17.
134505 F. Supp. at 447. This award was in accordance with the idea that defendant would
receive compensation

only if and to the extent that the events which led to those losses were actions of

the Cuban Government in violation of international law, typically including confiscation, and the chilling of the value of the asset prior to seizure which occurred
when confiscation became a foreseeable certainty. Id. at 447-48.
Therefore, the lower court made no award for losses resulting from secular change in Cuba. Id.
at 448.
135 505 F. Supp. at 451.
136 Assuming recovery were allowed under this theory, plaintiff alleged recovery should

only be $370,720. Id. at 453.
137 Under this second theory, Banco Nacional asserted that set-off should be $3,338,326.
Id.at 452.
138 Id.
139Id.
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The district court decided to award damages on the basis of the
theory that yielded greater damages, the conversion or single entity theory.140 This decision was affirmed with modifications on appeal.1 4 ' The
conversion theory involves nine items of damages. Banco Nacional and
Chase agreed that there should be set-off for stated capital, unremitted
profits, and contribution to retirement and thrift incentive plans, although they disagreed as to the amount that should be allowed for
each. 14 2 Banco Nacional disputed Chase's demand for a set-off for
unearned discount, reserve for taxes, charged-off loans, reimbursement to
personnel for losses suffered, banking houses and real estate appreciation
over book value, and going concern value or goodwill.
The lower court rapidly disposed of the issues of unearned discount,
reserve for taxes, charged-off loans, and reimbursement for personnel for
losses. Stating that unearned discount 43 was not an asset of the
branches until actually earned, the lower court refused set-off for that
item. 44 Reserve for taxes was also denied as an item of damages.' 45 The
federal district court found that this was a reserve for taxes already incurred but not yet paid. The Cuban Government was therefore due this
item in any event. A third item, charged-off loans, also was denied defendant as set-off.' 46 This item was based on losses arising from uncollectible loans made by the bank prior to the confiscation. Because Chase
had not been able to collect on these loans in the past, the court refused
to assume that Banco Nacional had collected or would in the future be
able to collect such loans, absent any evidence to that effect. 14 7 The
fourth item disallowed by the court was reimbursement to personnel.
The district court refused set-off for any claim that originally belonged to
a third party and was acquired by a defendant in anticipation of litigation. The rationale offered for this decision was that it might increase
claims against foreign states and nullify the Act of State Doctrine.' 14
This concern overshadowed the moral and possibly legal obligation of
49
Chase to reimburse its employees.'
The books and records of Chase Manhattan Bank indicated that
140 505 F. Supp. at 453.
141 658 F.2d at 880 n.9.
142 505 F. Supp. at 454-58.
143 "Unearned discount" is defined by the court as prepaid interest by borrowers not
earned by the bank as of the date of the taking, but which would be earned over the balance of
time for the loans outstanding. Id. at 458.
144 Id.

145 Id.
146 Id.
'47 Id.
148 Id. at 459.
149 Id. See Cohn v. Lionel Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 559, 562-63, 236 N.E.2d 634, 637, 289
N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (1968) which stated that

[tihe general rule is that, where one is employed or directed by another to do an
act in his behalf, not manifestly wrong, the law implies a promise of indemnity by
the principal for damages resulting from or expenditures incurred as a proximate
consequence of the good faith execution of the agency.
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four million dollars should be allocated as capital to the Cuban
branches.1 50 This figure was reduced by $391,000 that Chase was able to
recover on certain bonds.' 5' Plaintiff sought to further reduce the capital
set-off by deducting loans made by Chase's Cuban branches to Cuban
companies, which were guaranteed by parent corporations in the United
States. The theory used by Banco Nacional was that Chase could recover from the U.S. guarantors. This idea was rejected by the lower
court because it assumed that Banco Nacional collected the debts when
it seized the bank branches.' 52 In addition, Banco Nacional sought a
reduction in capital set-off for unrecorded depreciation in the market
value of the branches' securities.' 53 Though testimony was introduced
and
on this issue, the district court found the evidence too speculative
154
therefore denied Banco Nacional a reduction for this amount.
The four million dollar capital figure was increased by almost one
hundred thousand dollars for an overdraft by the branches existing at
the time of the nationalization. An additional six hundred thousand dollars was added for payments by Chase to beneficiaries of over two hundred international letters of credit seized. Thus, the total set-off allowed
for capital was $4,370,720. The lower court also allowed Chase to write
up its banking and real estate assets from their depreciated value to that
of an appraisal made some six months prior to nationalization.1 55
On appeal, the Second Circuit accepted as a given that Chase was
entitled to net asset value.' 56 The appellate court noted that despite
Banco Nacional's statement in "its brief that Chase's Cuban property
'was actually worthless,' we do not understand Banco Nacional to contend that Chase is not entitled to some compensation for at least the book
value of its Cuban assets."' 57 The court thereafter focused on whether
the award should include going concern value of the Cuban branches.
The lower court discussed going business value at length. The district court awarded compensation on a going concern basis "rather than
merely at the value of the sum of the constituent parts."1 58 The rationale
offered for this decision was that the Cuban Government continued to
use the banks as banks. Banco Nacional made the expropriated banks
part of the national banking system. 1 59 Having decided the threshold
question concerning going concern value-that an award should in fact
be made-the lower court proceeded to actually determine the going
150 505 F. Supp. at 454.
151

Id. at 454.

152 Id.

at 455. Banco Nacional offered no evidence to counter this assumption by the court.

153Id. at 455.
154Id. at 455-56.
155

Id. at 459.

156

658 F.2d at 893 n.23.

157Id.
158

505 F. Supp. at 445.

159 Id.
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concern value of Chase's branches. The district court distinguished going business value from goodwill, stating that
going business value is that price which a knowledgeable purchaser,

trading with a seller at arm's length ...will pay for the right to continue a going business, and to receive the income stream or cash flow

which that business will generate for the foreseeable future.
Goodwill, on the other hand, is the pure dollar value of the right to
receive the stream of income after the necessary capital has been in-

vested to enable the purchaser to continue in the business. It is the "premium" which the purchaser of a profitable business pays, over and
tangible components necessary to the operation of
the business. 16

above the value0 of the

The lower court considered goodwill plus capital and physical assets to
constitute going business value. The district court made the determination of set-off for going business value by multiplying a weighted average
deposit figure for 1950-60 by three and one-half percent. 16 1 The court
considered a variety of other methods. Charles Agemian, a former Executive Vice-President and Comptroller General of Chase, suggested that
the going business value be determined as the average of the figures resulting from the use of two different methods. The first method was
based on a percentage of deposits, a five year average of deposits multiplied by five percent. In contrast, the second was based on a multiple of
earnings. Under this method, the reported earnings of the branches over
five years were multiplied by ten. The district court rejected Agemian's
average of these two methods as arbitrary, and proceeded to further examine the two methods. ' 62 Both methods included figures from the prerevolutionary years, thereby ignoring the depressing effect that the Cuban Revolution had on banks. The district court thought it important
that only the 1959 and 1960 figures be considered, because much of the
decline in value did not result from violations of international law. Furthermore, the multiples of five percent for the deposit method and ten for
the earnings method were considered to be without a sufficient rational
163
basis.
Agemian offered a third calculation, as confirmation of the average
of his other two methods, based on straight capitalization of earnings.
Average earnings were multiplied by twenty, a figure which the court
rejected as "inappropriately high."' 164 Agemian's multiples were based
on four banks Chase had acquired, none of which the court found ade165
quately reflected the worth of the Cuban branches.
160Id. at 459-60.
161

Id. at 464. The percentage "is regarded as an index of the earning capacity of these

assets." 1 A. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 304 (5th. ed. 1953).
162505 F. Supp. at 460-62.
163

Id.

164 Id.

165 These included branches in the Clinton section of Manhattan, Staten Island, the Virgin
Islands, and the Honduras. d. at 461-62.
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In addition to Agemian's testimony as to going concern value, the
court also examined a report by a management consulting firm, Thomas
H. Barton & Company. The Barton report made its calculations based
on expected deposit and earnings growth. The report was based on an
assumption of "normal business patterns."' 166 Because of this assump16 7
tion, the district court rejected the Barton report.
What the district court finally chose as its valuation method for going concern value was a three and one-half percent multiple of the
weighted average deposit figure for 1959-60. The three and one-half
percent figure was determined arbitrarily by Judge Bryan, who originally heard the case. Support for this figure, however, is found in the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission's decision in the Chase case. 168
The FCSC chose to multiply the average deposits by three and one-half
percent although they used the average deposits over a five year time
period rather than just for the 1959-60 period. Thus, the position
adopted by the district court was similar to that taken in prior treatment
of the case.
The district court basically chose a valuation system of book value
plus a percentage of the deposits. The three and one-half percent multiple seems logical in this case. Arthur Dewing dealt with the determination of such a percentage in his two volume work, FtiancialPolicy of
Corporations.169 He stated,
If the bank is old, and has had a record of honorable dealings in the
community and a long-sustained earning power, then this percentage
may be as high as 5% or one-twentieth of the deposits. If, on the other
hand, the bank was only recently founded, is known to have an incom-

petent management, no increment of value may be given for the
deposits. 170
Considering the circumstances in this case, the three and one-half
percent figure seems valid for the 1959-60 era. Chase was a wellrespected bank, though the political climate was in too much turmoil for
an extremely high award to be made. Thus, the actual system of valuation used by the court appears acceptable.
On appeal, the Second Circuit refused to allow set-off based on going concern value.' 71 The appellate court took what it considered to be a
more realistic approach to the case. Stating that the lower court's "view
takes insufficient account of the acknowledged state of the Cuban economy following the revolution,"' 172 the Second Circuit went on to discuss
166

505 F. Supp. at 461.

167 Id.
168 In the Matter of the Claim of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., F.C.S.C., Decision No.
CU-6295 (Oct. 20, 1971). The lower court noted that it was not bound by the FCSC decision,
although that decision should receive some weight. 505 F. Supp. at 449.
169 A. DEWING, supra note 161, at 304.
170 Id.
171 658 F.2d at 893.
172 Id.
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the effect of nationalization on foreigners. The court also noted the depressing effect the revolution had on Chase's deposits in 1959 and
1960,113 and the fact that future earnings of the branches were "highly
speculative."' 174 The appellate court concluded that "at a time when
aliens were fleeing Cuba and many foreign businesses were being abandoned or nationalized [it had "no warrant for believing that"], a potential buyer with his eyes open would have paid Chase a premium in
anticipation of its future Cuban earnings."' 75 With this decision, the
Second Circuit ignored the traditional view espoused by the Restatement
which requires that "full value . . . unaffected . . . by conduct attributable to the taking State" be awarded.' 76 The court took a more liberal
view-that the fact that it was the Cuban Government's actions that
reduced the banks' worth should not be considered. This holding is in
keeping with de Ar6chaga's idea that the gain to the nationalizing state
should be determinative. 177 He stated that "there is no duty to compensate for loss of good will when the abolition of free market conditions of
competition nullifies the value of this intangible asset."' 78 This statement is, in effect, a synopsis of the Second Circuit's rationale for refusing
set-off for going concern value in the instant case.
The appellate court accepted the amount determined by the lower
court to be going concern value without discussion. Presumably, this implies acceptance of the lower court's actual valuation figure for going
concern, because the Second Circuit reduced the lower court's award by
79
$1,426,600-the amount originally awarded for going concern value.1
The lower court awarded almost seven million dollars as set-off to
Chase. 180 Because Chase conceded indebtedness to Banco Nacional of
some $9,794,020, after the lower court set-off was subtracted, Chase owed
Banco Nacional $2,889,150.18i It is important to note that the lower
court never added up the figures or stated that Chase owed Banco Na173 Id. at 894.
74 Id.

175Id.
176 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 188, Comment b.

177See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
178 See de Archaga, supra note 15, at 182.
179 658 F.2d at 894.
180 505 F. Supp. at 464.
Table of Set-off Items Awarded

by District Court
Capital, net of adjustments
Unremitted profits
Contributions to Retirement and Thrift Incentive Plans
Banking Houses and real estate appreciation over book value
Premium or Goodwill
Total

$4,370,720
923,320
129,372
54,858
1,426,600
$6,904,870

d.
181 The court refused to make an award in pesos as Banco Nacional requested. Id. at 46465.
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cional almost three million dollars. The lower court appeared reluctant
to admit that a U.S. bank was being placed in such a position. The
Second Circuit showed no such reluctance, openly stating that judgment
should be entered for Banco Nacional in the amount of $4,315,750.182
The federal district court also refused to award pre-judgment interest on the money Chase owed Cuba. The Banco court stated that under
Erie 183 principles, the determination of an award was to be made under
New York law.1 8 4 In New York, the state courts ordinarily only "award
pre-judgment interest on money from the time when the money becomes
due and payable."'' 8 5 Because 31 C.F.R. § 515186 expressly prohibits any
payments to Cuba, the debt was at no time payable. Thus, the lower
court awarded no interest. The Second Circuit left the interest issue confused, dealing with the issue in one sole phrase. It stated that "[w]e remand for entry of judgment for Banco Nacional in the amount of
'8 7
$4,315,750, plus such pre-judgment interest as may be appropriate."'
This phrase hints at the idea that interest may be awarded in spite of the
lower court's decision. The interest issue is very important because if
disbursement were permitted, the interest would more than double the
four and one-third million dollar debt owed Banco Nacional.
In conclusion, this case represents a break-through in the Cuban expropriation cases, as one of the first cases in a U.S. court in which an
actual value has been assigned to property expropriated by Cuba. Although the lower court awarded "full compensation," it refused to
blindly follow the U.S. bank's valuation figures. The district court
closely scrutinized the methods available and arrived at what it thought
to be a reasonable figure. The Second Circuit refused to follow the traditional U.S. view of compensation. Though the court stated it was awarding both "appropriate and full compensation,"'' 8 the court certainly
does not seem to have awarded what the United States has traditionally
considered to be "full" compensation. By denying award for going concern value, the appellate court, in effect, refused to follow the Chorzow
Factory case. Instead of following the traditional U.S. view that compensation should be in terms of value to the original owner, the Second Circuit chose to make its award in terms of value to the taker. With its
decision, the Second Circuit chose to follow a more liberal viewpoint
182 658 F.2d at 894. "Payment is to be made in accordance with 31 C.F.R. Part 515, to
await such disbursement as may be permitted by the appropriate authorities." Id.
183 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
384 505 F. Supp. at 448. The court noted that the "[tihe debt sued upon is here, the defendants are here, and New York was the place where Chase. . .should have credited Banco Nacional with the sums due in these sections." Id.
185Id. Accord, Gray v. Prudential Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'don other
grounds, 267 A.D. 688, 48 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1944). See Wheelock v. Tanner, 39 N.Y. 481, 504 (1868);
Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Heckschert & Gottleb, 260 A.D. 646, 648, 23 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1940), af'd,
285 N.Y. 674, 34 N.E.2d 277 (1941).
186 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1980).
187 658 F.2d at 894.
188 Id. at 892-93.
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than U.S. courts had previously done. The Second Circuit, however, had
a strategic advantage in the instant case which should not be ignored. As
noted previously, any amounts recovered by Cuba in actions in the
United States are currently frozen pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 515.189 Thus,
the ultimate responsibility for paying Cuba the $4.3 million does not rest
with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Because further congressional
action is necessary before payment will be made, the Second Circuit can
espouse a liberal viewpoint without bearing ultimate responsibility for
the action. Therefore, although this case purports to award Banco Nacional de Cuba over four million dollars, until the congressional freeze on
assets is lifted no payment will be forthcoming.
-MARY

189 Id. at 880 n.8.
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